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Abstract. In this paper, we consider a dynamic asset pricing model in an approximate fractional
economy to address empirical regularities related to both investor protection and past informa-
tion. Our newly developed model features not only in terms with a controlling shareholder who
diverts a fraction of the output, but also the good (or bad) memory in his budget dynamics which
can be well-calibrated by a pathwise way from the historical data. We find that poorer investor
protection leads to higher stock holdings of controlling holders, lower stock returns, lower interest
rates, and lower stock volatilities if the ownership concentration is sufficiently high. More impor-
tantly, by establishing an approximation scheme for the good (or bad) memory of investors on the
historical market information, we conclude that the good/bad memory would increase/decrease
both real stock returns and interest rates while the equilibrium balances the economy by prevent-
ing investors from benefiting the memory. Our model’s implications are consistent with a number
of interesting facts documented in the recent literature.
Keywords: Investor protection; Approximate fractional Brownian motion; Pathwise conver-
gence; Good/Bad memory.
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1 Introduction
The corporation owners are often classified into two types of shareholders—controlling sharehold-
ers and minority shareholders. The controlling shareholders dominate the corporation (e.g., [16]
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and [23]) and then they can divert resources for their private benefits. Therefore, it is very de-
manding to protect minority shareholders from expropriation by controlling shareholders. It is
natural for researchers to try establishing an overarching theory in line with the empirical liter-
ature. It is known that investor protection has multitudinous effects on the economy (such as
asset prices, consumption, etc.) and this may shed light on how investor protection exactly affects
shareholders’ stock holdings, stock returns and volatilities, interest rates, etc. On the other hand,
depending on the analysis of historical data with memory properties, historical information may
have a significant effect on the economy. In this paper, we adopt the effects of both investor
protection and past information to develop a theory in an approximate fractional economy with
a general equilibrium setting, and then try to emphasize key features of the equilibrium and
extensional phenomena with empirical evidence for the economy.
Investor protection in related literature has been studied with different forms under various
economy settings. Shleifer and Wolfenzon ( [33], 2002) assume that entrepreneur is caught for
diverting revenue with a probability and then adopt such probability as a measure of the legal
protection of investors. Under static two-date economy setting, they reveal that better investor
protection leads to lower ownership concentration, larger external capital markets and lager firms
in equilibrium, and their model additionally makes a number of general equilibrium predictions
which are consistent with developed empirical evidence. Albuquerue and Wang ( [1], 2008) in-
troduce a parameter to measure investor protection, which captures the role of laws and law
enforcement protection of minority investors. With their dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model (driven by Brownian motion), they conclude that imperfect investor protection would de-
crease investor welfare and reduce market value, and the model additionally predicts that weaker
investor protection conduces to more incentives to overinvest, higher return volatility, larger risk
premia and higher interest rate. Basak et al. ( [4], 2019) adopt the parameter limiting the con-
trolling shareholder’s power over the firm as the protection of minority shareholders. The model
contains the dynamics of output, bond, stock and investors’ self-financing budget constraints.
By solving both controlling shareholders’ and minority shareholders’ optimal wealth problems in
equilibrium, they draw a conclusion that better investor protection results in lower stock holdings
of controlling shareholders, higher stock returns and volatilities, and higher interest rates. For
more literature related to investor protection, we refer the reader to [5], [10], [14], [24] for static
models, and [11], [15] for dynamic models.
In reality, under the investor protection case, it is still strongly demanding to consider more
general and reasonable models to accord with empirical evidence. This naturally requires consid-
ering suitable assumptions and introducing efficient mathematical tools in previous models. To
our best knowledge, it has been widely examined by theoretical and empirical evidence that frac-
tional Brownian motions (fBms) are most suggested to capture memory properties of historical
financial data. The antipersistent fBm (Hurst index H < 12) has intermediate memory, whereas
the persistent one (Hurst index H > 12) has long memory (see, e.g. [32]). Mandelbrot and van
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Ness ( [27], 1968) suggest fBms as alternative models for assets’ dynamics which allow for depen-
dence between returns over time. Shokrollahi and Kılıc¸man ( [34], 2016) provide a new framework
for pricing currency options in accordance with the fBm model to capture long-memory property
of the spot exchange rate. Fouque and Hu consider optimal portfolio problems under fractional
stochastic environment in their recent papers. A first-order approximation of the optimal value
is established under the condition that the return and volatility of the asset are functions of a
stationary fast mean-reverting fractional Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process ( [18], 2018) as well as a
stationary slowly varying fractional Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process ( [19], 2018) respectively. One
can refer to [6], [22], [25], [28] for more researches on fBms. As far as we know, few literature
related to investor protection contains memory properties driven by fBms, and hence, we intend
to develop a new model which not only contains investor protection but also relates to memory
properties.
In fact, fBms can be hardly introduced to the complex economy in [4] which is the most related
to our paper. The main reason is that stochastic calculus for fBms is mainly the integral theory
based on Wick-product but not usual Itoˆ integrals (see [2], [6], [28]). For one thing, the model
based on Wick-product for fBms is much less analytical and tractable for the complex economy.
Hence, we may fail to reach the equilibrium in the economy and to study the effects of investor
protection. For another, integrals based on Wick-product for fBms are not pathwise in contrast
to Itoˆ integrals for Brownian motions, which implies that “the general state of a company does
not really have a noted stock price a priori, but it brings out a number (price) when confronted
with a market observer (the stock market)” (see Page 175 in [6]). Consequently, we could not
deal with historical realized financial data in a complex economy in a pathwise way. Therefore,
we choose an approximate fBm instead of fBm in the model of our economy:
B
ε,H
t =
√
2H
∫ t
0
(t− s+ ε)H− 12 dBs
for standard Brownian motion B, the Hurst index H ∈ (0, 1) and ε > 0, where the parameter√
2H is introduced to make the following BHt has same distribution with the associated fBm for
each t > 0. We note that the process Bε,Ht is indeed an approximation of fBm and then inherits
the memory properties of fBm. It can be proved (see [35], [36]) that when ε tends to 0, the process
B
ε,H
t converges in L
2 to the process
B
H
t =
√
2H
∫ t
0
(t− s)H− 12 dBs
which is the main memory part of fBm and can be viewed as a good approximation of the fBm for
large times (see Theorem 17 in [30]). On the other hand, the process Bε,Ht is a classic Itoˆ integral
with analytical expression (see (2.1)), and hence in such an economy we can achieve studying the
effects of investor protection and apply the historical realized financial data in the economy in a
pathwise way. Furthermore, it is known that the process Bε,Ht degenerates to Brownian motion
for H = 12 and hence such a fractional economy contains the usual economy.
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We note that the process Bε,Ht has been used in theoretical study as well as practical applica-
tions. Dung ( [12], 2011) applies the approximate fBm for an approximate fractional Black-Scholes
model and then the European option pricing formula is found. Because of the semimartingale
property, the effect of the approximate fBm on such pricing system is reflected in the Hurst index
and is independent of the historical realized stock price. Xu and Li ( [37], 2015) use the approxi-
mate fBm to study a class of doubly perturbed neutral stochastic functional equations driven by
fBm. Yue and Huang ( [38], 2018) introduce the approximate fBm to a general Wishart process
and achieve establishing ε-fractional Wishart process. It is known that the new process possesses
the approximate memory property inheriting from fBm. On the other hand, applying the new
process to the financial volatility theory, the new process extends both the one-dimension CIR
process ( [8]) and the high-dimension Wishart process (see [7], [13]). However, it is also difficult
to price derivatives by the historical realized stock price. Therefore, it is of much meaning to
make use of the historical realized data to obtain the equilibrium and then study the effects of
investor protection in such a fractional economy.
In this paper, we consider a dynamic asset pricing model in an approximate fractional econ-
omy to address empirical regularities related to both investor protection for minority shareholders
and memory properties of financial data. Our model features not only a controlling shareholder
who diverts a fraction of output but also the good (or bad) memory which investors obtain from
the historical realized output data of the economy in a pathwise way. In line with [4], we find
that poorer investor protection increases stock holdings of controlling holders, decreases stock
returns, decreases interest rates, and decreases stock volatilities when ownership concentration is
sufficiently high. More importantly, we reveal the economic behavior of the approximate frac-
tional economy in the following aspects: (i) describes the good (or bad) memory of investors on
the history market information and then establishes an approximation scheme with pathwise con-
vergence for the memory; (ii) concludes that higher Hurst index shall weaken investor protection
and the good/bad memory would increase/decrease both real stock returns and interest rates;
(iii) shows that the equilibrium plays a vital role to balance the economy by preventing investors
from benefiting the memory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches the financial model with
investor protection and approximate fBms. In Section 3 we derive the dynamics of asset prices in
equilibrium for the approximate fractional economy. In Section 4 we establish an approximation
scheme for past information by using the historical realized data of the output and then prove its
pathwise convergence. Before we summarizing this paper in Section 6, some numerical results are
given in Section 5 to address empirical regularities related to both investor protection for minority
shareholders and memory properties of financial data.
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2 Models driven by approximate fBms
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P) be a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions throughout
where Ft is generated by a standard Brownian motion W.
Define an approximate fBm WHt with parameter ε > 0 and H ∈ (0, 1) as
W
H
t =
√
2H
∫ t
0
(t− s+ ε)αdWs,
where t ≥ 0, α = H − 12 and we omit the parameter ε in WHt . By Itoˆ’s Lemma, we can express
W
H
t in an equivalent way (or one may refer to [35] for the case
1
2 < H < 1 and [36] for the case
0 < H < 12 ):
dWHt =W tdt+
√
2HεαdWt (2.1)
where W t =
√
2Hα
∫ t
0 (t− s+ ε)α−1dWs.
In above approximate fractional probability space, we construct a financial market and con-
sider its economy with investor protection (for more details, we refer to [4]). We focus on one
representative firm standing for amounts of identical firms. The exogenous stream of the output
associated with the firm is captured by
dD̂t = D̂t
[
µDdt+ σDdW
H
t
]
, (2.2)
where constants µD and σD > 0 represent the mean-growth rate (or return) and volatility of the
output, respectively.
The shareholders in the firm are sorted into two types—a controlling shareholders C and a
representative minority shareholders M . A bond Bt and a stock St traded by the shareholders
are respectively normalized to one unit and follow stochastic differential equations:
dBt = Btrtdt, B0 = 1; (2.3)
dSt = St
[
µtdt+ σtdW
H
t
]
, S0 > 0, (2.4)
where rt is the interest rate of the bond; µt is the mean-return (or return) of the stock; σt is the
volatility of the stock, and all processes rt, µt, σt are Ft-adapt and are endogenously determined
in equilibrium.
Furthermore, we assume that the wealth of shareholders C and M at time t, denoted by WCt
and WMt, are made up of portfolios of Bt and St and expressed as following equations:
Wit =bitBt + nitSt, (2.5)
dWit =
(
Witrt + nit(St(µt − rt) + (1− xt)Dt)− cit + liD̂t
)
dt
+
(
1{i=C}(xtDt − f(xt,Dt)) + 1{i=M}f(xt,Dt)
)
dt+ nitStσtdW
H
t , (2.6)
where,
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i ∈ {C,M};
bit is the number of units of bounds in the shareholder’s portfolio;
nit is the number of shares of stocks in the shareholder’s portfolio;
xt is the fraction of diverted output which satisfies the investor protection constraint with
a parameter p ∈ [0, 1] (interpreted as the protection of minority shareholders)
xt ≤ (1− p)nCt; (2.7)
cit is the consumption of the shareholder i;
li is the fraction of the output paid to the shareholder i as labor incomes;
Dt = (1− lC − lM )D̂t represents the net output;
f(x,D) = kx
2D
2 is assumed to be a pecuniary cost from diverting output with a constant k.
The parameter k captures the magnitude of the cost.
We now turn to constructing shareholders’ optimization problems with investor protection.
We assume that shareholders’ objective functions are determined by myopic preferences (utility
functions) over current consumption c and wealth W :
Vi(cit,Wit,Wi,t+dt) = ρui(cit)dt+ (1− ρdt)Et [ui(Wi,t+dt)] , i ∈ {C,M}, (2.8)
where ρ > 0 is a time-preference parameter and utility functions are given constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) functions
ui(c) =
c1−γi − 1
1− γi , i ∈ {C,M} (2.9)
with γM ≥ γC > 0. We will see in Sections 3 and 5 that though investors could obtain past
information from the historical realized data, the equilibrium ensures the increase of stock returns
at the cost of higher interest rates, and then prevents investors from benefiting their memory of
the economy. This accordingly reveals that investors should concentrate on current and (possible)
future information instead of past information, and hence it is rational and workable to assume
that shareholders’ objective functions are described by myopic preferences.
The controlling shareholder C maximizes VC through strategies of the investment nCt, the
consumption cCt and the diverting fraction xt:
max
nCt,cCt,xt
VC(cCt,WCt,WC,t+dt), (2.10)
where VC is given by (2.8) in the case i = C, subject to constraints (2.6) and (2.7), and maximum
share constraint nCt ≤ 1. Similarly, the minority shareholderM maximizes VM through strategies
of the investment nMt and the consumption cMt:
max
nMt,cMt
VM (cMt,WMt,WM,t+dt), (2.11)
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where VM is given by (2.8) in the case i =M , subject to the constraint (2.6) and maximum share
constraint nMt ≤ 1.
In the approximate fractional economy, new characteristics brought by approximate fBms
could be explained in two aspects–W t and H. It is seen that W t is the essential difference
between the approximate fBm WHt (in the case of H 6= 12 ) and the Brownian motion W
1/2
t = Wt.
In the case H = 12 , expressing (2.2) equivalently as
dD̂t = D̂t [µDdt+ σDdWt] ,
it is well-known that D̂t is a Markov process whose increments are independent of past information.
In the case H 6= 12 , rewriting (2.2) equivalently as
dD̂t = D̂t
[
(µD + σDW t)dt+
√
2HεασDdWt
]
, (2.12)
it is telling that the real return µD+σDW t depends on the volatility σD and the past information
W t. In such case W t is the past cumulate information of Wt and hence, it could be regard as the
cumulate quantity of the approximate fBm’s memory on [0, t]. As a result, in the case ofH = 12 the
increment of D̂t depends only on the information of D̂t, while in the case of H 6= 12 the increment
of D̂t is correlated to the information of {D̂s}0≤s≤t. Similar discussions could be considered for St
in (2.4) and Wit in (2.6). However, we shall see in Section 4 that W t can be known in theory and
be estimated in practice by using the information of {D̂s}0≤s≤t, which is crucial in our fractional
models. Furthermore, the Hurst index H also changes the real volatility
√
2HεασD of the output
by (2.12). Since there exists ε > 0 small enough such that g(H) =
√
2Hεα is a decreasing function
of H in the interval (− 2ln ε , 1), higher H in general leads to lower volatility of the output. If ε > 0
is extremely small, then the output shall be extremely volatile for H < 12 and be quite stable on
the contrary for H > 12 .
Remark 2.1. When H = 12 , the parameter ε disappears in W
H
t and our models (2.2)-(2.6)
degenerate to ones studied in [4].
3 Equilibrium with investor protection and approximate fBms
In this section, we solve for shareholders’ optimization problems (2.10) and (2.11) in the models
driven by approximate fBms and derive investors’ optimal strategies and asset price dynamics in
equilibrium. To this end, we start from a partial equilibrium setting where processes rt, µt and
σt are regarded as given processes. Then, making use of market clearing conditions, rt, µt and σt
are truly obtained in equilibrium.
Using (2.1) and Itoˆ’s Lemma we first decompose problems (2.10) and (2.11) into some equiva-
lent but more precise problems. Noting that Et[∼ dWt] = 0 with some Ft-measurable expressions
∼ and for i ∈ {C,M}
Et[ui(Wi,t+dt)] = ui(Wit) + Et[dui(Wit)],
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it is seen
Vi(cit,Wit,Wi,t+dt)
=
(
ρ
c1−γiit − 1
1− γi −W
−γi
it cit
)
dt+ (1− ρdt)W
1−γi
it − 1
1− γi +W
−γi
it liD̂tdt
+W 1−γiit
{
rt +
nitSt
Wit
(
µt − rt + (1− xt)Dt
St
+ σtW t
)
+1{i=C}
(
xt
Dt
Wit
− kx
2
t
2
Dt
Wit
)
+ 1{i=M}
kx2t
2
Dt
Wit
−Hε2αγi
(
Stσt
Wit
)2
n2it
}
dt.
Hence, the problem (2.10) for shareholder C is equivalent to
max
cCt
{
ρ
c1−γCCt − 1
1− γC −W
−γC
Ct cCt
}
; (3.1)
max
nCt,xt
JC(nCt;xt), (3.2)
where
JC(nCt;xt) =
nCtSt
WCt
(
µt − rt + (1− xt)Dt
St
+ σtW t
)
+ xt
Dt
WCt
− kx
2
t
2
Dt
WCt
−Hε2αγC
(
Stσt
WCt
)2
n2Ct. (3.3)
And the problem (2.11) for shareholder M is equivalent to
max
cMt
{
ρ
c1−γMMt − 1
1− γM −W
−γM
Mt cMt
}
; (3.4)
max
nMt
JM (nMt), (3.5)
where
JM (nMt) =
nMtSt
WMt
(
µt − rt + (1− xt)Dt
St
+ σtW t
)
−Hε2αγM
(
Stσt
WMt
)2
n2Mt.
Under a partial equilibrium setting, we obtain investors’ optimal strategies which is the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 3.1. In the model driven by the approximate fBm, the optimal consumptions c∗it, the
fraction of diverted output x∗t and the optimal stock holding n
∗
it for i ∈ {C,M} are given as follows:
c∗it =ρ
1
γiWit, i ∈ {C,M}; (3.6)
x∗t =x
∗
t (n
∗
Ct) = min
{
1− n∗Ct
k
, (1− p)n∗Ct
}
; (3.7)
n∗Ct =n
∗
Ct,i, if J
∗
C = JC(n
∗
Ct,i;x
∗
t )(Region i), i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}; (3.8)
n∗Mt =
µt − rt + (1− x∗t )DtSt + σtW t
2Hε2αγM
St
WMt
σ2t
, (3.9)
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where
n∗Ct,1 =
µt − rt + (2− p)DtSt + σtW t
2Hε2αγC
St
WCt
σ2t + (2(1 − p) + k(1− p)2)DtSt
; (3.10)
n∗Ct,2 =
µt − rt +
(
1− 1k
)
Dt
St
+ σtW t
2Hε2αγC
St
WCt
σ2t − 1k DtSt
; (3.11)
n∗Ct,3 =
1
1 + (1− p)k ; (3.12)
n∗Ct,4 =1; (3.13)
and
J∗C = max
{
JC(n
∗
Ct,1;x
∗
t ), JC(n
∗
Ct,2;x
∗
t ), JC (n
∗
Ct,3;x
∗
t ), JC(n
∗
Ct,4;x
∗
t )
}
(3.14)
Proof : As discussed in Section 2, W t is an Ft-adapt process and known theoretically by using
the information of {D̂s}0≤s≤t and we may deal with W t as an exogenous process like D̂t. Then
the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 in [4] and so we just sketch the proof.
Solving (3.1) and (3.4) gives (3.6). Maximizing the quadratic objective function JM in (3.5),
we obtain (3.9) where x∗t is given latter.
It is easy to see that Jc in (3.2) is a quadratic function of xt and
∂
∂x
JC(nCt;xt) = −k Dt
WCt
(
xt − 1− nCt
k
)
.
Hence, considering the constrain (2.7), we get x∗t (nCt) = min
{
1−nCt
k , (1 − p)nCt
}
. Substituting
x∗t (nCt) back into JC gives
JC(nCt) =
 JC1(nCt), nCt ≤ 11+(1−p)k (x∗t (nCt) = (1− p)nCt) ,JC2(nCt), nCt ≥ 11+(1−p)k (x∗t (nCt) = 1−nCtk ) , (3.15)
where
JC1(nCt) =− 1
2
St
WCt
[
2Hε2αγC
St
WCt
σ2t + (2(1 − p) + k(1− p)2)
Dt
St
]
n2Ct
+
St
WCt
[
µt − rt + (2− p)Dt
St
+ σtW t
]
nCt,
JC2(nCt) =− 1
2
St
WCt
[
2Hε2αγC
St
WCt
σ2t −
1
k
Dt
St
]
n2Ct
+
St
WCt
[
µt − rt +
(
1− 1
k
)
Dt
St
+ σtW t
]
nCt +
Dt
2kWCt
.
In the case of nCt ≤ 11+(1−p)k , it is obvious that JC1 is a quadratic concave function of nCt, and
there are two possible maximal points for JC1—n
∗
Ct,1 and n
∗
Ct,3. In the case of nCt ≥ 11+(1−p)k ,
JC2 is a quadratic concave or convex function (or even a linear function) of nCt, but it is clear
that there exist three possible maximal points for JC2—n
∗
Ct,2, n
∗
Ct,3 and n
∗
Ct,4. Summarizing
aforementioned analysis and searching over above points, we can determine the global maximum
and the associated maximum point n∗Ct, which gives (3.8) and (3.10)-(3.13). ✷
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Remark 3.1. Comparing with Proposition 1 in [4], the past information W t plays an important
and different role under the partial equilibrium setting. It seems that both the controlling share-
holder and the minority shareholder can benefit from the past information W t. If W t = 0, then by
(3.9) and (3.10)-(3.11), the past information W t contributes nothing to investors’ shares, which
implies shareholders have “no memory” for the past information W t. If W t > 0, then by (3.9)
and (3.10)-(3.11), shareholders would acquire more shares through the past information W t, which
implies that the past information W t > 0 is a kind of “good memory” for shareholders. Similarly,
if W t < 0, then by (3.9) and (3.10)-(3.11), shareholders would acquire less shares through the
past information W t, which implies that the past information W t < 0 is a kind of “bad memory”
for shareholders.
In the following part of this section, we obtain equilibrium dynamics µt, σt, rt, n
∗
it, b
∗
it and c
∗
it
(i ∈ {C,M}) in (2.3)-(2.6). We define a standard equilibrium as a set of µt, σt, rt, n∗it, b∗it and c∗it
(i ∈ {C,M}) satisfying the following market clearing conditions ( [4])
n∗Ct + n
∗
Mt = 1, (3.16)
b∗Ct + b
∗
Mt = 0, (3.17)
c∗Ct + c
∗
Mt = D̂t. (3.18)
Let
yt =
c∗Mt
D̂t
denote the minority shareholder’s share in the aggregate consumption. yt is an important state
process to derive equilibrium dynamics and following [4], we assume and then verify that yt
satisfies a form of
dyt = µytdt+ σytdW
H
t , (3.19)
where µyt and σyt are functions of yt and W t to be determined in equilibrium. Moreover, we also
define a similar Sharpe ratio κt as
κt =
µt − rt + (1− x∗t )DtSt + σtW t√
2Hεασt
. (3.20)
Theorem 3.2. In the model driven by the approximate fBm and under the equilibrium conditions
(3.16)-(3.18) with p ∈ [0, 1] and yt ∈ (0, 1), the shareholders’ optimal consumptions c∗it (i ∈
{C,M}) are given by (3.6), and the interest rate rt, the stock mean-return µt, the stock volatility
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σt, the Sharpe ratio κt, the parameters µyt and σyt are given by:
rt =µD + σD
(
W t −
√
2Hεακt
)
+ (1− yt)ρ
1
γC + ytρ
1
γM − ρ
1
γC lC − ρ
1
γM lM
− (1− lC − lM )x∗t ρ
1
γC − (1− lC − lM )
(
ρ
1
γM − ρ
1
γC
) kx∗2t
2
, (3.21)
µt =rt − σtW t +
√
2Hεακtσt − (1− x
∗
t )(1− lC − lM )
(1− yt)ρ−
1
γC + ytρ
− 1
γM
, (3.22)
σt =
σD[
n∗Ctρ
1
γC + (1− n∗Ct)ρ
1
γM
] [
(1− yt)ρ−
1
γC + ytρ
− 1
γM
] , (3.23)
κt =
√
2HεαγMσDρ
1
γM (1− n∗Ct)
yt
[
n∗Ctρ
1
γC + (1− n∗Ct)ρ
1
γM
] , (3.24)
σyt =yt
(
κt√
2HεαγM
− σD
)
, (3.25)
µyt =yt
(
rt − µD − σDW t + κ
2
t
γM
− ρ
1
γM
)
− (2Hε2ασD +W t)σyt (3.26)
+ ρ
1
γM lM + (1− lC − lM )ρ
1
γM
kx∗2t
2
. (3.27)
The shareholders’ optimal bond holdings b∗it and stock holdings n
∗
it (i ∈ {C,M}) could be expressed
as follows:
b∗Ct =exp
(
−
∫ t
0
rsds
)
(WCt − n∗CtSt), (3.28)
b∗Mt =− b∗Ct, (3.29)
n∗Ct =n
∗
Ct,j, if J
∗
C = JC(n
∗
Ct,j ;x
∗
t )(Region j), j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4},
n∗Mt =1− n∗Ct, (3.30)
where n∗Ct,i (i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) satisfy that
n∗Ct,1 =n
∗
Ct,2 + n
∗
Ct,2
(
1− n
∗
Ct,1
n∗Ct,3
)(
n∗Ct,1ρ
1
γC + (1− n∗Ct,1)ρ
1
γM
)2
× (1− p)(1− lC − lM )
2Hε2ασ2D
yt
ρ
1
γM γM
, (3.31)
n∗Ct,2 =
1−yt
ρ
1
γC γC
1−yt
ρ
1
γC γC
+ yt
ρ
1
γM γM
, (3.32)
n∗Ct,3 =
1
1 + (1− p)k , (3.33)
n∗Ct,4 =1; (3.34)
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and J∗C is given by (3.3) and (3.14) with x
∗
t , rt, µt, σt given by (3.7),(3.21)-(3.23) and
Dt
St
=
1− lC − lM
(1− yt)ρ−
1
γC + ytρ
− 1
γM
, (3.35)
Dt
WCt
=
1− lC − lM
(1− yt)ρ−
1
γC
, (3.36)
St
WCt
=
(1− yt)ρ−
1
γC + ytρ
− 1
γM
(1− yt)ρ−
1
γC
. (3.37)
Proof : Using (2.5), (3.6) and the market clearing conditions (3.16)-(3.18), we have
St =WCt +WMt,
Wit =c
∗
itρ
− 1
γi , i ∈ {C,M},
D̂t =ρ
1
γC WCt + ρ
1
γM WMt, (3.38)
which clearly implies that
D̂t
St
=
D̂t
c∗Ctρ
− 1
γC + c∗Mtρ
− 1
γM
=
1
(1− yt)ρ−
1
γC + ytρ
− 1
γM
, (3.39)
WCt
St
=
c∗Ctρ
− 1
γC
c∗Ctρ
− 1
γC + c∗Mtρ
− 1
γM
=
(1− yt)ρ−
1
γC
(1− yt)ρ−
1
γC + ytρ
− 1
γM
, (3.40)
WMt
St
=
c∗Mtρ
− 1
γM
c∗Ctρ
− 1
γC + c∗Mtρ
− 1
γM
=
ytρ
− 1
γM
(1− yt)ρ−
1
γC + ytρ
− 1
γM
. (3.41)
The above equations clearly gives (3.35)-(3.37). Inserting (3.35) into (3.20), the stock mean-
return µt (the equation (3.22)) is easily found.
Applying Itoˆ’s Lemma to both sides of (3.38) and then matching the terms of dt and dWt, it
is seen that
µD + σDW t =
c∗Ct
D̂t
(
rt +
√
2Hεαn∗CtσtκtSt
WCt
− ρ
1
γC
)
+ ρ
1
γC lC + ρ
1
γC (x∗t −
kx∗2t
2
)(1− lC − lM )
+
c∗Mt
D̂t
(
rt +
√
2Hεαn∗MtσtκtSt
WMt
− ρ
1
γC
)
+ ρ
1
γM lM + ρ
1
γM
kx∗2t
2
(1− lC − lM ),
σD =
c∗Ct
D̂t
n∗CtσtSt
WCt
+
c∗Mt
D̂t
n∗MtσtSt
WMt
.
Then by Substituting yt =
c∗
Mt
D̂t
, 1 − yt = c
∗
Ct
D̂t
and (3.40)-(3.41), we achieve deriving the interest
rate rt and the stock volatility σt as (3.21) and (3.23) respectively.
It is from (3.9) and (3.20) that
κt =
√
2HεαγM (1− n∗Ct)σt
St
WMt
,
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which together with (3.23) and (3.41) gives (3.24) of the Sharpe ratio κt.
Applying Itoˆ’s Lemma to both sides of
yt = ρ
1
γM
WMt
D̂t
(or ytD̂t = ρ
1
γM WMt)
and then matching the terms of dt and dWt again, we just get µyt and σyt as (3.25) and (3.27)
respectively.
Finally, we turn to derive b∗it and n
∗
it (i ∈ {C,M}). It is easy to obtain (3.28)-(3.30) and
(3.33)-(3.34). In Region 2, since x∗t (n
∗
Ct,2) =
1−n∗Ct,2
k , we may rewrite (3.11) as
n∗Ct,2 =
µt − rt +
(
1− x∗t (n∗Ct,2)
)
Dt
St
+ σtW t
2Hε2αγM
St
WMt
σ2t
=
κt√
2HεαγC
St
WCt
σt
,
and then by substituting (3.23), (3.24) and (3.40) for σt, κt and
WCt
St
we obtain
n∗Ct,2 =
1− yt
ρ
1
γC γC
ρ
1
γM γM
yt
(1− n∗Ct,2).
Solving the above equation for n∗Ct,2, we derive (3.32) for n
∗
Ct,2. In Region 1, as x
∗
t (n
∗
Ct,1) =
n∗Ct,1(1− p), we may rewrite (3.10) as
n∗Ct,1 =
µt − rt + (1− x∗t (n∗Ct,1))DtSt + σtW t + (1− p)[1− n∗Ct,1 − k(1− p)n∗Ct,1]DtSt
2Hε2αγC
St
WCt
σ2t
=
κt√
2HεαγC
St
WCt
σt
+ (1− p)
(
1− n
∗
Ct,1
1
1+(1−p)k
)
Dt
St
2Hε2αγC
St
WCt
σ2t
Then substituting (3.23), (3.24), (3.32),(3.33), (3.35) and (3.37) for σt, κt, n
∗
Ct,2, n
∗
Ct,3,
Dt
St
and
St
WCt
respectively, we obtain
n∗Ct,1 =(1− n∗Ct,1)
1− yt
ρ
1
γC γC
/
yt
ρ
1
γM γM
+
(
1− n
∗
Ct,1
n∗Ct,3
)(
n∗Ct,1ρ
1
γC + (1− n∗Ct,1)ρ
1
γM
)2
× (1− p)(1− lC − lM )
2Hε2ασ2D
1− yt
ρ
1
γC γC
,
and finally derive (3.31). ✷
Remark 3.2. We note here that there always exists a stock holdings n∗Ct,1 ∈ [0, 1] for (3.31).
Indeed, it suffices to show that the associated function
g(n) =n∗Ct,2 + n
∗
Ct,2
(
1− n
n∗Ct,3
)(
nρ
1
γC + (1− n)ρ
1
γM
)2 (1− p)(1− lC − lM )
2Hε2ασ2D
yt
ρ
1
γM γM
− n
13
has at least one zero point in [0, 1]. To this end, using n∗Ct,2 ∈ [0, 1] and n∗Ct,3 ∈ (0, 1] we could
verify that
g(0) =n∗Ct,2 + n
∗
Ct,2
(
ρ
1
γM
)2 (1− p)(1− lC − lM )
2Hε2ασ2D
yt
ρ
1
γM γM
≥ 0,
g(1) =(n∗Ct,2 − 1) + n∗Ct,2
(
1− 1
n∗Ct,3
)(
ρ
1
γC
)2 (1− p)(1− lC − lM )
2Hε2ασ2D
yt
ρ
1
γM γM
≤ 0.
which implies by the zero point theorem that there exists at least one n∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that g(n∗) = 0.
Remark 3.3. By Theorem 3.1 (or Proposition 3 in [4]), n∗Ct in Theorem 3.2 solves the fixed-point
equation
n∗Ct = argmax
nCt,0≤nCt≤1
JC(nCt)
= argmax
nCt,0≤nCt≤1
{
nCtSt
WCt
(
µt − rt + (1− x∗(nCt))Dt
St
+ σtW t
)
+x∗(nCt)
Dt
WCt
− kx
∗(nCt)
2
2
Dt
WCt
−Hε2αγC
(
Stσt
WCt
)2
n2Ct
}
(3.42)
with
x∗(nCt) = min
{
1− nCt
k
, (1− p)nCt
}
and other parameters given in Theorem 3.2. The stock holding n∗Ct could be chosen from n
∗
Ct,i (i =
1, 2, 3, 4). Hence, to obtain n∗Ct, we just need to seek the Region j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} such that
JC(n
∗
Ct,j) = max{JC(n∗Ct,i), i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}},
where for each j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, the parameters in JC should be related to Region j.
It is of much importance to note that the equilibrium in Theorem 3.1 may not exist. We give
a simple example here. Set H = p = yt =
1
2 , γM = γC , k = 2, ρ = σD = 0.01, which is a special
scenario in [4]. Then it is easy to obtain n∗Ct,1 = n
∗
Ct,2 = n
∗
Ct,3 =
1
2 and n
∗
Ct,4 = 1.
In Region 1 (or Region 2, Region 3, equivalently), we have σt = σD, µt = µD, rt = µD−σ2D+ 38ρ
and DtSt =
ρ
2 ,
Dt
WCt
= ρ, StWCt = 2, which gives
JC(n) = 2n
(
σ2D −
3
8
ρ+ (1− x∗(n))ρ
2
)
+ x∗(n)ρ− x∗(n)2ρ− 2σ2Dn2.
Hence, JC(n
∗
Ct,1) = JC(n
∗
Ct,2) = JC(n
∗
Ct,3) = σ
2
D +
3
16ρ = 0.0019 and JC(n
∗
Ct,4) =
ρ
4 = 0.0025.
Since 0.0019 < 0.0025, the stock holding n∗Ct does not locate in Region 1, 2 or 3.
In Region 4, we have σt = σD, µt = µD, rt = µD +
1
2ρ and
Dt
St
= ρ2 ,
Dt
WCt
= ρ, StWCt = 2, which
gives
JC(n) = −nρx∗(n) + x∗(n)ρ− x∗(n)2ρ− 2σ2Dn2.
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Hence, JC(n
∗
Ct,1) = JC(n
∗
Ct,2) = JC(n
∗
Ct,3) = −σ
2
D
2 +
ρ
16 = 5.57 × 10−4 and JC(n∗Ct,4) = −2σ2D =
−2× 10−4. Since 5.57 × 10−4 > −2× 10−4, the stock holding n∗Ct does not locate in Region 4.
Summarizing above discussion, the stock holding n∗Ct, as well as the equilibrium in Theorem
3.1, does not exist. However, we shall always consider scenarios where the equilibrium in Theorem
3.1 exists in our paper.
In a perfect economy, the controlling shareholder can not divert output for his private benefit,
which is the case p = 1 and denoted by the benchmark economy. Hence, we give the benchmark
equilibrium by applying Theorem 3.1 directly.
Corollary 3.1. In the model driven by the approximate fBm and under the equilibrium conditions
(3.16)-(3.18) with p = 1 and yt ∈ (0, 1), the shareholders’ optimal consumptions cBit (i ∈ {C,M})
are given by (3.6), and the interest rate rBt , the stock mean-return µ
B
t , the stock volatility σ
B
t , the
Sharpe ratio κBt , the parameters µ
B
yt and σ
B
yt are given by:
rBt =µD + σD
(
W t −
√
2HεακBt
)
+ (1− yt)ρ
1
γC + ytρ
1
γM − ρ
1
γC lC − ρ
1
γM lM , (3.43)
µBt =r
B
t − σBt W t +
√
2HεακBt σ
B
t −
1− lC − lM
(1− yt)ρ−
1
γC + ytρ
− 1
γM
, (3.44)
σBt =
σD[
(1− yt)ρ−
1
γC + ytρ
− 1
γM
] [
(1− nBCt)ρ
1
γM + nBCtρ
1
γC
] , (3.45)
κBt =
√
2HεαγM (1− nBCt)σDρ
1
γM
yt
[
(1− nBCt)ρ
1
γM + nBCtρ
1
γC
] , (3.46)
σByt =yt
(
κBt√
2HεαγM
− σD
)
, (3.47)
µByt =yt
(
rBt − µD − σDW t +
(κBt )
2
γM
− ρ
1
γM
)
− (2Hε2ασD +W t)σByt + ρ 1γM lM . (3.48)
The shareholders’ optimal bond holdings bBit and stock holdings n
B
it (i ∈ {C,M}) could be expressed
as follows:
bBCt =exp
(
−
∫ t
0
rBs ds
)
(WCt − nBCtSt), (3.49)
bBMt =− bBCt, (3.50)
nBCt =
1−yt
ρ
1
γC γC
1−yt
ρ
1
γC γC
+ yt
ρ
1
γM γM
, (3.51)
nBMt =1− nBCt. (3.52)
Proof : The benchmark condition p = 1 implies, by (2.7), that xt ≡ 0 and f(x,D) ≡ 0.
Substituting p = 1 and xBt = 0 into Theorem 3.2, it suffices to obtain n
B
Ct to complete the proof.
Indeed, by setting p = 1 in (3.15) and (3.31), we know that the condition 11+(1−p)k = 1 implies
nBCt could be discussed equivalently in Region 1, and (3.51) is obtained easily. ✷
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Remark 3.4. From Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.1, it is clearly that the past information W t
disappears in shareholders’ stock holdings n∗Ct and n
∗
Mt. This is owning to equilibrium conditions
(3.16)-(3.18) and we shall discuss it in Section 5 later. Since the optimal stock holding may
not exist in equilibrium with extreme values of exogenous model parameters, n∗Ct may appear to
be a discontinuous function of yt. However, we shall not consider such a discontinuity in our
calibration of Section 5.
Conditions yt = 0 and yt = 1 implies that WMt = 0 and WCt = 0 respectively. Such related
results are practically meaningful, but we can hardly apply those conditions to Theorem 3.1.
Noticing that all equilibrium results in Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.1 are continuous functions
of yt ∈ (0, 1) and W t, we shall assume that they are continuous at yt = 0 and yt = 1, which
means we take their values at yt = 0 and yt = 1 by considering yt → 0+ and yt → 1− respectively.
Hence, we extend all equilibrium results to the case yt ∈ [0, 1] in Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.1.
As yt → 0 implies WMt → 0, we obtain n∗Mt → 0 and then n∗Ct → 1 by n∗Mt + n∗Ct = 1. Now we
assume p < 1 and yt is sufficiently small in some interval I = (0, δ) with δ > 0. The fact that n
∗
Ct
is a continuous function of yt implies that n
∗
Ct should locate in Region 2 or Region 4. If n
∗
Ct locates
in Region 2 for yt ∈ I (which is the only case for p = 1), κt(yt) converges to κt(0) =
√
2HεασDγC
by substituting n∗Ct,2. If n
∗
Ct locates in Region 4 for yt ∈ I, κt(yt) converges to κt(0) = 0. If p = 1,
then n∗Ct = n
B
Ct. Similar discussion could be done for the case yt = 1. Finally, by yt → 0+ and
yt → 1−, the equilibrium results for the case yt = 0 and yt = 1 are given by
x∗t (0) =0,
rt(0) =µD + σD
(
W t −
√
2Hεακt(0)
)
+ ρ
1
γC − ρ
1
γC lC − ρ
1
γM lM ,
µt(0) =rt(0)− σDW t +
√
2Hεακt(0)σD − (1− lC − lM )ρ
1
γC ,
σt(0) =σD,
κt(0) =
{ √
2HεασDγC , n
∗
Ct = n
∗
Ct,2 for p < 1 and yt ∈ I; or p = 1
0, n∗Ct = 1 for p < 1 and yt ∈ I
σyt(0) =0,
µyt(0) =ρ
1
γM lM ,
n∗Ct(0) =1,
n∗Mt(0) =0,
and
x∗t (1) =0,
rt(1) =µD + σD
(
W t −
√
2Hεακt(1)
)
+ ρ
1
γM − ρ
1
γC lC − ρ
1
γM lM ,
µt(1) =rt(1) − σDW t +
√
2Hεακt(1)σD − (1− lC − lM )ρ
1
γM ,
σt(1) =σD,
16
κt(1) =
√
2HεαγMσD,
σyt(1) =0,
µyt(1) =rt(1) − µD − σDW t + κ
2
t (1)
γM
− ρ
1
γM + ρ
1
γM lM ,
n∗Ct(1) =0,
n∗Mt(1) =1.
4 An approximation scheme for W
In this section, for a fixed T > 0 we use the information {D̂t}0≤s≤T to estimate W T by
constructing an approximation scheme with pathwise convergence.
Setting Zt = ln D̂t, it is seen by Itoˆ’s Lemma that
dZt =
(
µD + σDW t −Hε2ασ2D
)
dt+
√
2HεασDdWt. (4.1)
Define the approximation scheme as
∆Ŵtn+1 =
Ztn+1 − Ztn −
(
µD + σDŴtn −Hε2ασ2D
)
∆t
√
2HεασD
; (4.2)
Ŵtn+1 =
n∑
k=0
√
2Hα(tn+1 − tk + ε)α−1∆Ŵtk+1 , Ŵt0 = 0, (4.3)
where n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1 with N ∈ N and 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn < · · · < tN−1 < tN = T are the
time nodes of the discretization. For simplicity we also assume that ∆t = tn+1 − tn = T/N ≤ 1
for each n.
In the following part of this section, we assume that T,∆t, ε,H, µD, σD are all fixed constants
and Cp (or C) will denote a nonnegative constant depending only on p whose value may change
from line to line. Now we may state the pathwise convergence of the approximation scheme
(4.2)-(4.3).
Theorem 4.1. For all δ > 0, there exists a nonnegative random variable Kδ depending only on
δ with EKpδ < +∞ for all p ≥ 1 such that
sup
n=0,1,··· ,N−1
∣∣∣W tn+1(ω)− Ŵtn+1(ω)∣∣∣ ≤ Kδ(ω)(∆t) 16−δ (4.4)
for almost all ω ∈ Ω.
With Theorem 4.1 and the approximation scheme (4.2)-(4.3), we may achieve estimating W t
pathwise at the time nodes 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn < · · · < tN−1 < tN = T . For the proof, we first
consider several lemmas.
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For n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, define an approximation scheme used in definitions of Itoˆ integrals as
Z˜tn+1 − Z˜tn =
(
µD + σDW tn −Hε2ασ2D
)
∆t+
√
2HεασD∆Wtn+1 , Z˜t0 = Zt0 ; (4.5)
W˜tn+1 =
n∑
k=0
√
2Hα(tn+1 − tk + ε)α−1∆Wtk+1 , W˜t0 = 0, (4.6)
where ∆Wtn+1 = Wtn+1 −Wtn . Setting
Yn+1 = (Z˜tn+1 − Z˜tn)− (Ztn+1 − Ztn)
for n = 0, 1, · · · , N−1, we could estimate their moments and pathwise convergence as the follows.
Lemma 4.1. For all p ≥ 1 and n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, there exists a nonnegative constant Cp such
that
E|Yn+1|p ≤ Cp(∆t)
3
2
p. (4.7)
Proof : By definition (4.5), we may rewrite Z˜tn+1 − Z˜tn as
Z˜tn+1 − Z˜tn =
∫ tn+1
tn
(
µD + σDW tn −Hε2ασ2D
)
dt+
∫ tn+1
tn
√
2HεασDdWt
Then it is seen that
Yn+1 =
∫ tn+1
tn
σD(W tn −W t)dt.
For p = 1,
E|Yn+1| ≤ σD
∫ tn+1
tn
E
∣∣W tn −W t∣∣ dt; (4.8)
and for p > 1,
E|Yn+1|p ≤σpDE
[∫ tn+1
tn
∣∣W tn −W t∣∣ dt]p
≤σpDE
[(∫ tn+1
tn
∣∣W tn −W t∣∣p dt) 1p (∫ tn+1
tn
1qdt
) 1
q
]p
=σpD(∆t)
p
q
∫ tn+1
tn
E
∣∣W tn −W t∣∣p dt, (4.9)
where 1p +
1
q = 1 and we use Ho¨lder inequality.
Noticing the definition of W t, we know that W tn − W t (t ∈ [tn, tn+1]) possesses a normal
distribution with the mean 0 and the variance σ2n for all n (here the constant random variables
are considered to be normal random variables with variances 0). If we can prove that there exists
a nonnegative constant C such that
σ2n ≤ C∆t, (4.10)
then it is from (4.8)-(4.9) and moment properties of normal distribution that
E|Yn+1|p ≤
{
C1
∫ tn+1
tn
(∆t)
1
2 dt, p = 1,
Cp(∆t)
p
q
∫ tn+1
tn
(∆t)
p
2 dt, p > 1,
= Cp(∆t)
3
2
p, (4.11)
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which just prove the lemma.
Indeed, for each n and t ∈ [tn, tn+1], we have
σ2n =E(W tn −W t)2
=CE
[∫ t
0
(
1s≤tn(tn − s+ ε)α−1 − (t− s+ ε)α−1
)
dWs
]2
=C
∫ t
0
(
1s≤tn(tn − s+ ε)α−1 − (t− s+ ε)α−1
)2
ds
=C
[∫ tn
0
(
(tn − s+ ε)α−1 − (t− s+ ε)α−1
)2
ds+
∫ t
tn
(t− s+ ε)2(α−1)ds
]
=C(I1 + I2), (4.12)
where
I1 =
∫ t
tn
(t− s+ ε)2(α−1)ds,
I2 =
∫ tn
0
(
(tn − s+ ε)α−1 − (t− s+ ε)α−1
)2
ds.
It is easy to see by 2(α− 1) ∈ (−3,−1) that
I1 ≤
∫ t
tn
ε2(α−1)ds ≤ C∆t. (4.13)
Since ∆t < T and α− 2 ∈ (−52 ,−32), we have
|(tn − s+ ε)α−1 − (t− s+ ε)α−1|
=|(α − 1)ξα−2(t− tn)| (ξ ∈ (tn − s+ ε, t− s+ ε))
≤|(α − 1)εα−2|(t− tn)
≤C∆t,
which clearly entails
I2 ≤
∫ tn
0
(C∆t)2ds ≤ C(∆t)2 ≤ C∆t. (4.14)
Substituting (4.13)-(4.14) into (4.12), we obtain (4.10), which completes the proof. ✷
Lemma 4.2. Define
VN =
N−1∑
n=0
|Yn+1|.
Then for all δ > 0, there exists a nonnegative random variable K1δ depending only on δ with
EKp1δ < +∞ for all p ≥ 1 such that
VN (ω) ≤ K1δ(ω)(∆t)
1
6
−δ
for almost all ω ∈ Ω.
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Proof : We first recall that for any nonnegative a1, a2, · · · , aN ,(
N−1∑
n=0
an+1
)p
≤
(
N · max
n=0,1,··· ,N−1
an+1
)p
≤ Np
(
N−1∑
n=0
apn+1
)
, p ≥ 1.
In the case p ≥ 3,
EV pN ≤ Np
(
N−1∑
n=0
E|Yn+1|p
)
≤ Np
(
N−1∑
n=0
Cp(∆t)
3
2
p
)
≤ Cp(∆t)
p
2
−1,
which implies by ∆t ≤ 1 that [
EV pN
] 1
p ≤ Cp(∆t)
1
2
− 1
p ≤ Cp(∆t)
1
6 . (4.15)
In the case 1 ≤ p < 3,
EV pN ≤
[
E(V pN )
3
p
] p
3
=
[
EV 3N
] p
3 ≤ Cp(∆t)
p
6 ,
which gives [
EV pN
] 1
p ≤ Cp(∆t)
1
6 . (4.16)
Hence it is from (4.15) and (4.16) that for all p ≥ 1[
EV pN
] 1
p ≤ Cp(∆t)
1
6 . (4.17)
Consequently, by applying Lemma 1 in [20] or Lemma 3.4 in [21] to (4.17), we obtain the
statement of the lemma. ✷
Lemma 4.3. Define
UN = max
n=0,1,··· ,N−1
∣∣∣W tn+1 − W˜tn+1∣∣∣ .
Then for all δ > 0, there exists a nonnegative random variable K2δ depending only on δ with
EKp2δ < +∞ for all p ≥ 1 such that
UN (ω) ≤ K2δ(ω)(∆t)
1
6
−δ
for almost all ω ∈ Ω.
Proof : For k, n ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}, define
Xk+1 =
∫ tk+1
tk
(
(tn+1 − s+ ε)α−1 − (tn+1 − tk + ε)α−1
)
dWs,
and it is seen by definitions of W tn+1 and W˜tn+1 that
W tn+1 − W˜tn+1
=
√
2Hα
n∑
k=0
∫ tk+1
tk
(tn+1 − s+ ε)α−1dWs −
√
2Hα
n∑
k=0
∫ tk+1
tk
(tn+1 − tk + ε)α−1dWs
=
√
2Hα
n∑
k=0
Xk+1
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and
UN ≤
√
2H |α|
N−1∑
k=0
|Xk+1|. (4.18)
Since Xk+1 possesses a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance satisfying
EX2k+1 =
∫ tk+1
tk
(
(tn+1 − s+ ε)α−1 − (tn+1 − tk + ε)α−1
)2
ds
=
∫ tk+1
tk
(α− 1)2ζ2(α−2)(s− tk)2ds (ζ ∈ (tn+1 − s+ ε, tn+1 − tk + ε))
≤
∫ tk+1
tk
(α− 1)2ε2(α−2)(∆t)2ds
=(α− 1)2ε2(α−2)(∆t)3,
we get by moment properties of the normal distribution that for all p ≥ 1 there exists a nonnegative
constant Cp such that
E|Xk+1|p ≤ Cp(∆t)
3
2
p.
Now by a similar proof of (4.17), it is seen that for all p ≥ 1[
EUpN
] 1
p ≤ Cp(∆t)
1
6 , (4.19)
which implies by Lemma 1 in [20] or Lemma 3.4 in [21] again that the statement of the lemma
holds true. ✷
Proof of Theorem 4.1: For almost all ω ∈ Ω (which we shall omit in our following proof for
simplicity) and n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, it is seen from (4.2)-(4.3) and (4.5)-(4.6) that
|W tn+1 − Ŵtn+1 |
≤|W tn+1 − W˜tn+1 |+ |W˜tn+1 − Ŵtn+1 |
≤UN +
n∑
k=0
√
2H|α|εα−1
∣∣∣∆Wtk+1 −∆Ŵtk+1∣∣∣ ((4.3) and (4.6))
≤(∆t) 16−δK2δ + |α|
εσD
n∑
k=0
(|Yk+1|+ σD∆t|W tk − Ŵtk |) (Lemma 4.3, (4.2) and (4.5))
≤(∆t) 16−δK2δ + |α|
εσD
(∆t)
1
6
−δK1δ +
|α|∆t
ε
n∑
k=0
|W tk − Ŵtk |(Lemma 4.2)
=(∆t)
1
6
−δK3δ +
|α|∆t
ε
n∑
k=0
|W tk − Ŵtk |,
where
K3δ = K2δ +
|α|
εσD
K1δ .
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Using the discrete Gronwall lemma (see Lemma 1.4.2 in [31]), we have
|W tn+1 − Ŵtn+1 | ≤(∆t)
1
6
−δK3δ exp
{
n∑
k=0
|α|∆t
ε
}
≤(∆t) 16−δK3δ exp
{ |α|T
ε
}
.
By setting
Kδ = K3δ exp
{ |α|T
ε
}
,
it is telling that EKpδ < +∞ for all p ≥ 1 and
|W tn+1 − Ŵtn+1 | ≤ Kδ(∆t)
1
6
−δ. (4.20)
Finally noticing right side of (4.20) is not related to n, we just prove the theorem. ✷
Remark 4.1. We note here that the approximation scheme (4.2)-(4.3) works in the case H = 12
though we do not have to use it to approximate W t. Indeed, since α = H − 12 = 0 in the case
H = 12 , it is obtained from (4.3) that Ŵtn+1 = 0, which clearly implies Ŵtn+1 = W tn+1 for
n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1.
5 Numerical results
In this section, by numerical results we shall analyse how the memory facts W t and H affect
investor protection and asset prices.
Following the work of [4], we set µD = 0.015, σD = 0.13, γC = 3, γM = 3.5, ρ = 0.01, k =
3, lC = 0.1, lM = 0.5 as basic parameters for our model. Moreover, we put ε = 0.1 and vary yt
from 0 to 1 with the step length 0.01, and other parameters may change in different scenarios.
5.1 Past information
The past information W t is a remarkable characteristic in our approximate fractional economy
and determines how investors treat the economy at the present time t by using the historical
realized data. As we noted in Remark 3.1, “no memory” (W t = 0), “good memory” (W t > 0)
and “bad memory” (W t < 0) of the economy could lead to different equilibriums.
Observing the approximation scheme (4.2)-(4.3), there are multiple complex factors determin-
ing which case among “no memory”, “good memory” and “bad memory” the economy is located
in. So we just roughly analyze the past information W t by theoretical and numerical methods.
We set specially ε = 10−5 or ε = 0.1, the time interval [0, T ] = [0, 1] with ∆t = 10−3 and some
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given historical realized data Z as
Z1(t) =0.015 + 0.02(t − 0.5),
Z2(t) =0.015 − 0.02(t − 0.5),
Z3(t) =0.015.
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Figure 1: Past information W t with ε = 10
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Figure 2: Past information W t with ε = 0.1
It is seen by (4.2)-(4.3) and Figures 1 and 2 that the parameter ε plays an important role to
determine the type of investors’ memory.
When ε is sufficiently small, the real volatility
√
2HεασD of the output depends on Hurst
index H. For H < 0.5, the real volatility of the output is extremely high. In such a economy,
no matter how the historical returns of the output behave, investors can not trust the extremely
volatile market. Panel (a) in Figure 1 (with parameters H = 0.35 and ε = 10−5) shows that the
past information is a kind of “bad memory” (i.e. W t < 0) for shareholders in such economy. For
H < 0.5, the real volatility of the output is extremely low. In such a economy, investors would
focus on wether the realized returns of the output exceed the mean returns of the output. Panel
(c) in Figure 1 (with parameters H = 0.65 and ε = 10−5) shows that the past information is a kind
of “good memory” (i.e. W t > 0) for shareholders when the returns of the output behave better
than their expectations (i.e. Z = Z1), while the past information is a kind of “bad memory” for
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shareholders when the returns of the output behave worse than their expectations (i.e. Z = Z2
and Z = Z3).
When ε is not sufficiently small, the real volatility
√
2HεασD of the output is neither extremely
high nor extremely low. In such a economy, investors should take both returns and volatilities
into account by making use of the historical data. Both plane (a) (with parameters H = 0.35,
ε = 0.1, Z = Z2 and Z = Z3) and plane (c) (with parameters H = 0.65, ε = 0.1, Z = Z1 )
in Figure 2 show that it is worth for investors risking volatilities to benefit from returns, which
indicates that the past information is a kind of “good memory” for shareholders. Both plane (a)
(with parameters H = 0.35, ε = 0.1, Z = Z1) and plane (c) (with parameters H = 0.65, ε = 0.1,
Z = Z2 and Z = Z3) in Figure 2 also show that it is unworthy for investors enduring risks to gain
returns, which indicates that the past information is a kind of “bad memory” for shareholders.
Specially, when ε disappears in the economy (i.e. the case of H = 0.5), our economy is driven
by Brownian motion with “no memory” properties. In such a economy, investors can not get
any useful information from the historical realized data whatever the historical realized data Z
behave. Panel (b) in Figure 1 (with parameters H = 0.5 and ε = 10−5) and panel (b) in Figure
2 (with parameters H = 0.5 and ε = 0.1) present that the past information is a kind of “no
memory” for shareholders.
5.2 Stock holdings and diverted output
Controlling shareholder’s stock holding n∗Ct is the basic and crucial result in equilibrium. So we
start our numerical analysis in equilibrium with Figures 3 and 4 demonstrating the effects of
investor protection and Hurst index on controlling shareholder’s equilibrium stock holding. We
first note here that higher Hurst index H causes lower market volatility as it is seen from Section
2 and Figure 8 that higher Hurst index H leads to lower volatilities of the output and stock.
Figure 3 shows that whatever H takes (H = 0.35 on panel (a), H = 0.5 on panel (b) and
H = 0.65 on panel (c)), poorer investor protection leads to higher controlling shareholder’s stock
holding n∗C relative to the full protection benchmark, which is consistent with panel (a) of Figure 2
in [4]. This is because facing same volatility risk caused by fixedH under both imperfect protection
and full protection, the controlling shareholder can divert a larger fraction of output when he
owns more shares in the case of imperfect protection, which gives the controlling shareholder an
incentive to acquire more shares.
With yt increasing, n
∗
C stays in Region 2 when the controlling shareholder’s consumption share
is high (yt is low), while n
∗
C switches to Region 1 when the controlling shareholder’s consumption
share is low (yt is high). In the case of Region 1, besides that investor protection p < 1 urges con-
trolling shareholder to acquire more shares, different Hurst indices result in different acquirements
of shares for controlling shareholder. It is seen by panels (a)-(b) in Figure 4 that the higher H
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Figure 3: Stock holdings n∗Ct with different indices H
25
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
y
t
 (p=0.6)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
n
C*
H=0.35
H=0.5
H=0.65
(a) p = 0.6
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
y
t
 (p=0.9)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
n
C*
H=0.35
H=0.5
H=0.65
(b) p = 0.9
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
y
t
 (p=1)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
n
C*
H=0.35
H=0.5
H=0.65
(c) p = 1
Figure 4: Stock holdings n∗Ct with different indices p
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is, the higher n∗C tends to be when investor protection is imperfect (which is consistent with the
examinations in [9] and [17]). This is because higher Hurst index H decreases the stock volatility
σH (see Figure 8) facilitating controlling shareholder to acquire more shares. In the case of Re-
gion 2, it is from (3.32) and (3.51) that p and H do not involve, and then the investor protection
constraint and volatility risk do not bind leading to n∗Ct|p=i,H=u = n∗Ct|p=j,H=v (i, j ∈ {0.6, 0.9, 1}
and u, v ∈ {0.35, 0.5, 0.65}, see panels (a)-(c) in Figure 3 and panels (a)-(c) in Figure 4). The
reason is that holding lots of shares reduces the benefits of diverting the output.
It is from the proof of Theorem 3.1 that the fraction of diverted output x∗t is directly related
to controlling shareholder’s stock holding, which contributes to understanding controlling share-
holder’s stock holding more precisely. Figures 5 and 6 depict effects of investor protection and
Hurst index on the equilibrium fraction of diverted output.
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Figure 5: Fraction of diverted output x∗t with different indices H
Figure 5 shows that poorer investor protection (p is lower) leads to higher fraction of diverted
output for fixed H, which is consistent with our common sense. Comparing to Figures 3 and 4,
the kinks in Figures 5 and 6 make it much easier to verify when n∗Ct lies in Region 1 or Region 2.
As discussed in [4], the kink is the separation of point of Region 1 and Region 2: the constraint
xt ≤ (1− p)nCt is binding when nCt is sufficiently small, while the constraint is not binding and
controlling shareholder would not steal from himself when nCt is sufficiently large. Hence, if yt
lies to the left-side (right-side) of the kink, then n∗Ct stays in Region 2 (Region 1) for imperfect
protection.
Similar to what we have discussed in Figures 3 and 4, the effect of H on the fraction of diverted
output for imperfect protection could be considered by Figure 6 in two ways. On the one hand, H
has no influence on the fraction of diverted output in Region 2 as we have expected from (3.32).
On the other hand, higher H leads to higher fraction of diverted output in Region 1, which is
because higher H urges controlling shareholder to acquire more shares so that the fraction of
diverted output x∗t = (1− p)n∗Ct increases. Hence, Planes (a) and (b) in Figure 6 also show that
higher Hurst index H (i.e. lower volatility of the economy) shall weaken investor protection for
minority shareholder, consistent with the empirical evidence in [3] and [29].
Observing (3.31)-(3.34), it is clear that controlling shareholder’s stock holding n∗Ct critically
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Figure 6: Fraction of diverted output x∗t with different indices p
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depends on investor protect p and Hurst index H. However, n∗Ct in general is non-monotone
in p or H. The investor protection parameter p has two opposing influences on stock holding
n∗Ct. Better investor protection prevents the controlling shareholder from diverting the output,
while better investor protection extends Region 1 for imperfect protection (Figure 5), loosing the
role of the cost of stealing. Similarly, Hurst index H affects stock holding n∗Ct in two opposing
ways. On the one hand, higher Hurst index H may cause lower stock volatility risk (see Figure 8)
and in such circumstances the controlling shareholder prefers to own more shares. On the other
hand, higher Hurst index H may lead to lower stock excess return (see Figure 9) and in such
circumstances the controlling shareholder would acquire less shares.
5.3 Stock return and volatility
Similar to discussion of the output D̂t in Section 2 , it is easy to see that the real stock return
and stock volatility are µWt = µt + σtW t and σ
H
t =
√
2Hεασt. For the purpose of compare, we
also denote the stock excess return by µHt = µt − rt + (1− x∗t )DtSt + σtW t.
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Figure 7: Stock volatility σH =
√
2Hεασt with different indices H
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Figure 8: Stock volatility σH =
√
2Hεασt with different indices p
Figure 7 shows that for fixed Hurst index H, the real stock volatility σH in the economy with
imperfect protection is higher than σH,B in the benchmark economy with perfect protection, i.e.
σH ≥ σH,B. In Region 2, the fact that σH and σH,B both depend on same stock holding n∗Ct = nBCt
by (3.23) and (3.45) gives σH = σH,B easily. In Region 1, it is seen σH > σH,B in general, which
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Figure 9: Stock excess return µH = µt − rt + (1− x∗t )DtSt + σtW t with different indices H
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Figure 10: Stock excess return µH = µt − rt + (1− x∗t )DtSt + σtW t with different indices p
means that the stock is more volatile in the economy with imperfect protection. The reason may
be explained in two aspects: “with imperfect protection the controlling shareholder holds more
shares than in the full protection benchmark, and hence is under-diversified” (see [4]), and the
controlling shareholder is less risk-averse than the minority shareholder. The under-diversified and
less risk-averse properties make controlling shareholder’s wealth and consumption more volatile,
which then translates into the stock market.
Figure 8 describes the effect of Hurst index H on the real stock volatility σH showing that
higher Hurst index H decreases the real stock volatility σH in equilibrium. This is because
g(H) =
√
2HεασD is a decreasing function of H ∈ [0.35, 0.65] such that volatility of the output
Dˆt in our model tends to decrease and hence, shareholder’s consumption become less volatile by
the market clearing condition (3.18) , which then translates into the stock market through the
equilibrium conditions.
It is seen from Figure 9 that for fixed Hurst index H, the real stock excess return µH in the
economy with imperfect protection is lower than µH,B in the benchmark economy with perfect
protection. As discussed in Figure 3, the investor protection constraint does not bind (and
no output is stolen by the controlling shareholder) in Region 2 resulting in µH = µH,B, and
the investor protection constraint binds (and a fraction of output is stolen by the controlling
shareholder) in Region 1 leading to µH < µH,B in general.
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Figure 10 shows that for fixed investor protect p, higher Hurst index H decreases the real stock
excess return µH . There are two main reasons. On the one hand, it is from the arbitrage-free
theory (“there is no such thing as a free lunch” , see, e.g. [26] ) that lower risk leads to lower
return, and by analysis in Figure 8, higher Hurst index H could decreases the real stock excess
return µH . On the other hand, for imperfect protection p < 1, since higher Hurst index H leads to
higher fraction of diverted output (Figure 6), the controlling shareholder can divert more output
for himself, which decreases the real stock excess return µH .
5.4 Effects of past information
It is interesting to notice that the real stock excess return µH does not depend onW t in equilibrium
though the definition of µH = µt − rt + (1 − x∗t )DtSt + σtW t contains the item W t. The reason
could be found by (3.21) and (3.23): the effect of W t on the real stock return µ
W neutralizes the
effect of W t on the interest rate rt. Similar results could be obtained for aforementioned stock
holdings n∗Ct, fraction of diverting output x
∗
t and stock volatility σt. Hence, the past memory
information W t does not benefit shareholders’ investing strategies in equilibrium. This implies
that shareholders should pay no attention to the past information, which is consistent with the
assumption of myopic preferences for investors. However, it is so different by Theorem 3.1 that
n∗Ct depends on W t under the partial equilibrium setting, which indicates that the equilibrium
plays an important role in our economy. Hence, we finally try to figure out how past information
W t functions in equilibrium.
Panels (b) in Figures 11 and 12 are cases in [4] and other Panels are new cases in our economy,
which shows the essential difference between the equilibrium driven by Brownian motion and the
approximate fBm. On the one hand, the fractional equilibrium prevents investors from benefiting
past information and forces them into focusing on current known information and future uncertain
information. On the other hand, the fractional equilibrium system (not like investors) pays global
attention to information by applying past information (see Figures 11 and 12 or µt in (3.22) and
rt in (3.21)) to maintain the equilibrium in our economy. In the good memory (W t > 0) time,
investors should benefit from the increase of the real stock return µHt (see Panels (a) and (c)
in Figure 11 or (3.22)) by taking advantages of past information, but the equilibrium system
neutralizes such benefit by increasing the interest rate rt (see Panels (a) and (c) in Figure 12 or
(3.21)). In the bad memory (W t < 0) time, investors should suffer a loss from the decrease of
the real stock return µHt (see Panels (a) and (c) in Figure 11 or Figure (3.22)) because of past
information, but the equilibrium system neutralizes such loss by decreasing the interest rate rt
(see Panels (a) and (c) in Figure 12 or (3.21)).
Furthermore, in the case of W = 0, Figure 12 indicates that the interest rate rt is lower in
the economy with poorer investor protection for fixed H. On the one hand, since poorer investor
protection decreases the real stock excess return as we have discussed in Figure 9, investors
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Figure 11: Stock return µW = µt + σtW t with different indices H
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Figure 12: Interest rate rt with different indices H
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Figure 13: Interest rate rt with W t = 0 and different indices p
(especially the minority shareholder who can not benefit from diverting output) turn to investing
bonds with cheaper credit, which then decreases the interest rate. On the other hand, by last two
items in (3.21), since poorer investor protection increases the fraction of diverted output x∗t as
we have discussed in Figure 5, stock investing could be partially covered by the diverted output
leading to the decrease of the interest rate. Figure 13 shows that higher H increases the interest
rate rt for fixed p. This is because higher H increases the fraction of diverted output x
∗
t as we
have discussed in Figure 6, which is a more dominant effect than the decrease effect of H on the
real stock excess return and hence results in the increase of the interest rate.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, based on the model in [4] with investor protection and Brownian motion, we intro-
duce an approximate fBm to a dynamic asset pricing model in an economy to address empirical
regularities related to both investor protection for minority shareholders and memory properties of
financial data. Besides a controlling shareholder who diverts a fraction of output, our model also
features the good (or bad) memory obtained from the historical realized data in a pathwise way.
In theory, we derive asset price dynamics in equilibria, and through the historical realized data,
we establish an approximation scheme with pathwise convergence for the good (or bad) mem-
ory of investors on the historical market information, which ensures our theoretical results can
be applied to numerical analysis. In numerical analysis, we find that poorer investor protection
shall increase stock holdings of controlling holders, decrease stock returns, decrease interest rates,
and decrease stock volatilities if ownership concentration is sufficiently high. Furthermore, higher
Hurst index shall weaken investor protection and the good/bad memory would increase/decrease
both real stock returns and interest rates.
There are several problems which have not been considered in this paper and we leave these
as our future work. The driven approximate fBms of the output and the stock may be totally
different, which means that investors have different memories for the output and the stock re-
spectively. As we have achieved dealing with the memory for the output, how could we obtain
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the past information with pathwise convergence from the historical realized price of the stock?
Even in the economy driven by Brownian motion (i.e. H = 12), there may not exist equilibria
under market clearing conditions (3.16)-(3.18) in the economy with extreme parameters. Then
how could we deal with such extreme markets? Finally, the convergence rate ((∆t)1/6) of the
approximation scheme for W t is very slow and so developing some more efficient approximation
schemes for W t remains to be solved.
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